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STATE OF UTAH 
S. \V. DOvVSE, 
Plaintiff and Respoudent, 
-vs.-
DORIS TR"CST CO:JIP A~Y, a cor-
poration, 
· Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7220 
S. W. Dowse, the plaintiff and respondent (herein-
after referred to as plaintiff) instituted this suit against 
defendant and appellant above-named (hereinafter re-
ferred to as defendant) for slander of title to real prop-
erty, alleging that as a result of malicious conduct on 
the part of defendant in recording an instrument (here-
inafter referred to as the Notice), plaintiff suffered 
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$5,000.00 general damages (par. 4 of his complaint), 
that he had to pay out $250.00 attorney's fee to com-
mence and prosecute an action to quiet title because of 
the filing of said Notice, and that therefore he was also 
entitled to $5250.00 exemplary damages (par. 7 of com-
plaint), and then in the prayer, asked for $250.00 paid 
out to counsel to clear title and $5,000.00 exemplary 
damages. (R. 1-6). 
At the trial the court granted a motion for a direc-
ted verdict (R. 108) and directed a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff for $250.00 (R. 113-115 ), the amount alleged 
to have been paid for attorney's fee, and submitted the 
amount of punitive damages to the jury. The jury then 
brought in its verdict in which it found the issues in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, as directed, 
and assessed his damages in the sum of $250.00 com-
pensatory and $500.00 exemplary damages, or a total of 
$750.00 (R. 40-A); and judgment on the verdict was 
entered April 16, 1948. (R. 41). 
\Vithin the time allowed by order of the court, de-
fendant's bill of exceptions herein was served and 
settled, defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, 
all exhibits or portions of exhibits received in evidence, 
the minute entries and entries in the Register of Action, 
and orders and proceedings of the court being incorpor-
ated therein and made a part thereof. (R. 122). De-
fendant's notice of appeal was served and filed June 26, 
1948 (R. 45 ), and cost bond and stay bond filed herein. 
(R. 46). 
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The action grew out of a former suit, No. 76,888 in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, etah, in which the court entered judgment quiet-
ing title in plaintiff, and granting defendant $1047.50. 
X o eosts were allowed either party. In the fonner ac-
tion, the court set out in its findings that there was an 
oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant for the 
~ale to defendant of the property involved in the ac-
tion; that the defendant had paid $1,000.00 on the pur-
chase price thereof; that the full agreement was not re-
duced to writing, nor sufficient 1nemorandum made, and 
' hence was null and void, and no part eYer carried out 
except the payment of the $1000.00 (R. 11-12). 
~ As to the Pleadings: 
In his complaint herein, plaintiff alleged that on 
July 18, 1945, he acquired title to certain lots in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, described as Lots 1 to 11, Fox's 
~ Subdivision of Lot 2, Block 23, Five Acre Plat "A", 
1 Big Field SnlTey, from the Salt Lake Valley Loan & 
p, Trust Company; and on the 9th day of August, 1945, 
the defendant falsely and maliciously and with intent 
to encumber and cloud plaintiff's title, and to harass 
and vex him in the quiet enjoyment thereof, caused to 
be recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, an instrument (hereinafter referred 
to as the Notice), of which the following is a copy: 
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Doris Trust' Company, 
1430 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, Aug. 9, 1945 
NOTICE 
To whom it may concern: That certain prop-
erty described as : All of Lots one to eleven in 
Fox's Subdivision, an addition to Salt Lake City, 
Utah-was purchased for Doris Trust Company 
by S. W. Dowse, as their agent. That One Thou-
sand Dollars has been paid toward the purchase 
price and that the balance, plus a reasonable 
commission will be paid on demand on delivery 
of deed. 
State of Utah 
(Signed) Addison Cain, 
President, Doris Trust Co. 
County of Salt Lake SS. 
Addison Cain, being first duly sworn, did say 
that he is President of Doris Trust Company-
has full knowledge of the within statement and 
that the same is true of his own knowledge. 
(Signed) L. B. Cardon, Notary Public 
(Seal) My commission expires May 26, 1948." 
(Recorded at request of Addison Cain, Aug. 9, 
1945 at 2:50 M. fee paid $.50. 
Cornelia S. Lund, Recorder, Salt Lake . , 
County, Utah 
(Signed) Cornelia S. Lund (R. 2) 
Plaintiff then set out, par. 4 (R. 2) in his com-
plaint, 
"That the claim set forth in said instrument 
which was duly recorded as hereinabove set forth 
was false and without right whatever, and de-
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fendant at time of recording said instrument as 
hereinabove set forth, had no estate, right, title 
or interest whateYer in or to or upon said land 
or premises, or any part thereof; that the record-
ing of said notice cast a cloud upon and a slander 
upon plaintiff's title to said property decreasing 
the value of said real estate and making it un-
marketable all to the damage of said real estate 
and said plaintiff in the sum of Five Thousand 
($5,000.00) Dollars." (R. 2). 
And further, par. 5, (R. 3), ·' ... that plaintiff was 
required to engage counsel and pay said counsel the 
sum of $250.00 to commence and prosecute an action to 
quiet the title to his said lands in order that he might 
remove the apparent cloud upon his title and make said 
title to said land marketable; . . . '' 
A copy of Decree and Judgment was attached to 
the complaint and made a part thereof. (R. 1-6). 
Defendant filed a general and a special demurrer 
(R. 7) to the complaint, and on :.May 7, 1947, the demur-
rer was overruled (R. 9), and defendant given ten days 
to file an answer; that defendant filed its answer (R. 
10-12), admitting filing the Notice mentioned, alleging 
that it had paid plaintiff the $1,000.00 referred to in said 
Notice on the purchase price of the lots described 
therein; admitted judgment entered in the prior case, 
as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit "A" (R. 5, 6) in his 
complaint, and alleging that the said judgment was 
based on findings of fact and conclusions of law in said 
prior case, a copy of which was set out in defendant's 
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answer; and denying each and every other allegation. 
(R. 10-12). 
No reply was filed. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON 
Defendant relies on the following errors for a re-
versal of the judgment appealed from: 
1. The court erred in overruling plantiff's general 
demurrer. (R. 9). 
2. The court erred in overruling plaintiff's special 
demurrer. ( R. 9). 
3. The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for dismissal of the complaint. (R. 50, 52). 
4. The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to testimony. (R. 50, 52). 
5. The court erred in admitting in evidence plain-
tiff's Exhibit C. (R. 80, 81). 
(This exhibit was later changed to C-1 and C-2, R. 
117). 
6. The court erred in refusing defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. (R. 107). 
7. The court erred in granting plaintiff's motion 
for a directed verdict. (R. 106, 108). 
8. The court erred in submitting the question of 
amount of exemplary damages to the jury. (R. 113). I I 
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9. The court erred with respect to each portion of 
Instruction No. 1 as given to the jury ( R. 113-114) and 
to which defendant noted an exception. (R. 117). 
10. The court erred in failing to charge the jury 
as set forth in each of defendant's requested instruc-
tions Nos. 1 to 5, inclusiYe. (R. 35-39). 
A statement and argurnents upon the particular 
questions pertinent to the claimed errors specified are 
below set forth under numbered POINTS. Such state-
ment and argument with respect to any error relied 
upon appear below under the POINT bearing the same 
number as that given the above paragraph specifying 
that error. 
STATE~IE~T AND ARGU~MENTS UPON THE 
PARTICULAR QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR 
DETERMINATIO~ 
POINT 1. 
THE CouRT ERRED IN OvERRULING PLAINTIFF's 
GENERAL DEMURRER. 
Slander of title is a false and malicious state-
ment, oral or written, made in disparagement of 
a person's title to real or personal property, 
causing him special damages, and the essential 
elements ·are uttering and publishing of slander-
ous words, falsity of words, malice, and special 
damages.--Cawse v. Signal Oil Co., 103 P. 2d 729; 
129 ALR 174 (Ore.). 
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Slander of title is a false and malicious state-
ment, oral or written, made in disparagement of 
a person's title to real or personal property, 
causing him special damage, and is not an action 
for defamation of character of the person, and 
is therefore distinguishable from ordinary libel 
or slander.-Woodward v. Pacific Fruit & Produce 
Co., 106 P 2d 1043; 131 ALR 832 (Ore.). 
To maintain an action for slander of title, it 
must appear that the words complained of were 
false, that they were maliciously spoken, and re-
sulted in pecuniary injury to plaintiff.-Potsi 
Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 135 P. 1078, 36 Nev. 390. 
Plaintiff in an action for slander of title, must 
prove utterance and publishing of slanderous 
words, falsity thereof, malice, special damages, 
and interest in property slandered.-Rittenhouse 
v. Johnson, 17 P 2d 457, 161 Okl. 169. 
From the foregoing ''general definitions'', and 
cases hereinafter cited, it would appear that the essen-
tial elements of an action for slander of title, which 
plaintiff must allege and prove, are: 
(A) Uttering and publishing of slanderous word::;; 
(B) The falsity thereof; 
(C) Maliciously 1nade or spoken ; 
(D) Disparaging plaintiff's title and resulting in 
special damages. 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff's complaint does 
not set out the above-mentioned essential elements; and 
asserts further, not only does it not set out the abo\'•'-
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mentioned P~~t'll tial element8, but that it does not sd 
out any one of them. 
~\s special damagPs seem to be the gist of an action 
for slander of title of property, without ·which the actioH 
could not be maintained, the ''utterance of mere false-
hood alone not being sufficient." ( lV a rd v. Gee, '61 S'V 
2d 555), that phase of the complaint will be discussed 
first. 
(D) Special Damages 
The complaint does not allege that plaintiff snffereu 
any special damages, and hence is fatally defective. 
In an action for slander of title to property, 
plaintiff must plead special damages.-W ittntan 
Bros. v. Witteman Co., 151 N.Y. Sup. 813. 
A complaint for slander of title must not only 
allege that the statement complained of was false 
and published maliciously, but that pecuniary 
damage resulted by reason thereof.-Felt v. Ger-
mania Life Ins. Co., 133 N.Y. Sup. 519. 
Plaintiff in an action for slander of title must 
allege and prove special damages, and it is not 
enough merely to allege generally that he intended 
to sell to any person who might buy, but he must 
allege and prove loss of sale to some particular 
person.-Hubbard v. Scott, 166 P. 33, 85 Ore. 1. 
Defendant filing counter claim for slander of 
title must plead and prove special damages.-
Farmers State Bank of Harris, Iowa v. Hintz, 
221 N.W. 540, 206 Iowa 911. 
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Words spoken or written regarding property 
or title are not actionable per se, but special 
damages must be shown.-Briggs v. Coykendall, 
224 N.W. 202, 57 N. D. 785. 
A counterclaim pleading no special damages 
states no cause of action for slander of title-
Seeck & Kade v. Pertussin Chemical Co., 256 
N.Y.S. 567, 235 App. Div. 251. 
Recovery of damages for slander of title re-
quired proof that pending sale to named prospec-
tive purchaser was defea.ted.-H oust on Chronicle 
Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 SW 2d 170. 
The rule requiring the complaint to allege 
special damages is well settled. Necessary to 
allege a. loss of sale to some particular person or 
give the name of the prospective purchaser-
Burkett v. Griffith, 27 P. 527. 
An action for slander of title is not one for 
words spoken, but for special damages for losses 
sustained by reason of the speaking and publica-
tion of the slander of plaintiff's title.-Hardin 
Oil Co. v. Spencer, 266 SW 654, 205 Ky. 842. 
In an action for slander of title, only special 
damages can be recovered, and such damages 
must be particularly pleaded.-Cronkhite v. 
Chaplin, 282 Fed. 579 (U. S. C. C. A. Okla.). 
Special damages of a. pecuniary nature is the 
gist of the action for slander of title, and such 
damages must be directly or particularly set out 
in the complaint; a. general allegation of loss 
being insu:fficient.-Dent v. Balch, 104 S. 651, 213 
Ala. 311. 
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'l1o establish action for slander of title, word~ 
complained of must be false and 1naliciously 
spoken with reference to pending sale or purchase 
of property, and they must result in pecuniary 
loss or injury to party complaining and slander 
must be such as goes to defeat plaintiff's title.-
Lee v. Jlaggard, 85 P. 2d 654, 197 "\Yash. 380. 
~o allegation is made in the cmnplaint that a pend-
ing sale was defeated. nor has an:· prospective purchaser 
heen named, nor has any alleged damage been distinctly 
or particularly set out, or injury suffered by reason of 
loss of any surh prospective sale. 
In paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint appears the 
following (R. 3): 
'' ... that plaintiff was required to engage 
counsel and pay said counsel the sum of $250.00 
to comn1ence and prosecute an action to quiet the 
title to said lands in order that he might remove 
the apparent cloud upon his title and make said 
title to said land marketable ... " 
No allegation is set out as to whom such payment 
was made, or when, or whether the amount was reason-
ahle for such service. 
Defendant asserts that attorney's fees are not re-
coverable as damages in an action for slander of title. 
In the case of llfcGuinness v. Hargiss (56 "\Vash. 162, 
105 P. 233), respondent charged appellant "·ith slander-
ing their title to real estate, and sought damages and 
the removal from the record of the offending instrument 
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as a cloud upon their title. The claim for damages was 
general, with the exception of a special plea for attor-
ney's fee. The court below made findings in favor of 
respondents, holding the recorded writing to be a slan-
der and cloud upon respondents' title and awarding 
damages in the sum of $350.00, and the case \Yas brought 
to the Supreme Court on appeal. That court stated that 
there were only two questions involved: one, as to an 
existing contract; and the other, the question, are the 
respondents, upon the pleading and proofs, entitled to 
damagef:. In deciding the second question, the court held 
that the lower court erred, holding, 
'' ... that in an action for slander of title it is 
the recognized rule that only special damages 
must be pleaded and proved. There was no plea 
nor proof of special damages, except the claim 
for attorney's fee for the prosecution of the ac-
tion. We have unif9rmly held that in this state 
attorney's fee, either as damages or cost, other 
than statutory, are not recoverable.'' 
Other cases to the same effect : 
Attorney's fees are not recoverable as dam-
ages in slander of title or jactitation suit.-City 
of Shreveport v. Kahn, 193 So. 461, 194, La. 55. 
Expenses of a suit to establish title cannot 
be recovered.-Cohen v. Minzescheimer, 118 N. 
Y. S. 383. 
In an action by option holder for slander of 
their title by statement that the option had ter-
minated, plaintiffs could not recover attorney's 
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fees in defense of prior suit by owner to forfeit 
option.-Hubbard v. Scott, 166 Pac. 33, 85 Or. 1. 
Lessors suing lessees for defamation of title 
following refusal to cancel lease of record fol-
lowing forfeiture, could not recover attorney's 
fees; attorney's fees not being recoverable in an 
action for defamation of title.-Barquin v. H aU 
Oil Co., 201 P. 352, 28 Wyo. 164. 
In the last mentioned case, the court further held: 
''Defamation of title of property was not con-
sidered harmful at common law and not action-
able unless special damages were shown. And 
since these special damages are the gist and 
heart of the action, a peculiar strictness governs 
in respect to the pleadings and evidence. As was 
said in Griffin vs. Isbell, 17 Ala. 186: 'There is 
perhaps no other civil action which has been 
treated so strictly by the courts.' Hence the 
special damages must be specially pointed out or 
the petition is demurrable.'' 
(A) Uttering and Publishing of Slanderott·S Words. 
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint, par. 3 (R. 1), that 
the defendant 
" . caused to be recorded in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the following ... " 
(referring to the Notice above mentioned); and after 
setting out the Notice in the complaint, in par. 4 (R. 2), 
also alleges : 
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"That ... the instrument was duly recorded 
... that the recording of said notice cast a cloud 
upon and a slander upon plaintiff's title ... " 
In other words, plaintiff claims that the recording-
of the instrument was the thing that cast a cloud and 
a slander upon plaintiff's title; nothing else being relied 
upon so far as "publishing" and "uttering" is con-
cerned. There is no allegation that anyone saw it or 
was influenced by it. 
By virtue of Section 78-3-2, 1943 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 
''Every conveyance, or instrument in writing 
affecting real estate executed, acknowledged or 
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed 
by this title, ... shall, from the time of filing the 
same with the recorder of record, impart notice 
to all persons of the contents thereof ... " 
And Section 78-2-6 of the said Code provides that, 
''The certificate of acknowledgement of an 
instrument by a corporation must be substan-
tially in the following form: 
'State of Utah, County of Salt Lake. 
On the ........ day of ........................ personally 
appeared before me-------------·-························-, who 
being by me duly sworn (or affirmed) did say 
that he is the president (or other officer or 
agent, as the case may be) of (naming cor-
poration), and that said instrument was signed 
in behalf of said corporation by authority of 
its by-laws (or of a resolution of its board of 
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directors, as the case may be), and said ------------
----·-·-··-·······-··-acknowledged to nw that said cor-
poration executed the same.' '' 
The acknowledgement shown in the Notice set out 
in par. 3 of plaintiff's co1nplaint (R. 2) is not in sub-
stantial form or compliance as required by the statute 
above referred to, and the ~ otice was not entitled to 
be recorded, and therefore not published. ''Since notice 
from a record is a creature of statute, the statute giving 
it such effect must be complied with." Doris Trust Co. 
v. Quermbach et al, 103 Utah 120,127. The entry on the 
record of an instrument which is not entitled by the 
statute to be recorded is not legally a record and did 
not give ... constructive notice of its contents. lb. p. 128. 
Since the sole act of publishing or uttering was the 
recording of the instrument, as alleged in the complaint, 
and relied upon as the act of slander of title, defendant 
asserts there was no publishing, as shown on the face 
of the complaint. 
(B) Falsity of the Words. 
The complaint does not deny the falsity of the 
words. 
To maintain an action for slander of title, it 
must appear that the words complained of were 
false.-Potsi Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 135 P. 1078, 
36 Nev. 390. 
To establish action for slander of title, words 
complained of must be false.-Lee v. Maggard, 
85 P 2d. 654, 197 Wash. 380. 
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The complaint in an action for slander of title 
must allege the uttering and publishing of the 
slanderous words, as well as the falsity and mali-
ciousness of the statement.-Stovall v. Texas Co., 
Tex. Civ. App. 262 SW 152. 
In plaintiff's complaint, after setting out the Notice, 
and in paragraph 4 (R. 2), he alleges: 
''That the claim set forth in said instrument 
which was duly recorded as hereinabove set forth 
was false and without right whatever ... " 
Plaintiff has not set out in his complaint what w<;>rds 
were false; neither has he denied that any of the words 
set out were false. He merely alleges that the "claim" 
set forth was false. This is not a denial of any slander-
ous words. 
(C) Malice. 
There is not one act of malice set out in the com-
plaint. 
In par. 3 of the complaint (R. 1), plaintiff alleges 
that on or about August 9, 1945, the defendant, 
''falsely and maliciously and with intent to 
encumber and cloud plaintiff's title to said lands, 
and to harass and vex plaintiff in the quiet en-
joyment thereof, caused to be recorded ... " the 
Notice. 
Futher, par. 6 (R. 3), 
"that the acts of said defendant have been 
actuated by malice, and that said defendant has 
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been guilty of oppression and malice 1n his ac-
tions aforesaid . . . '' 
Again, in par. 7 (R. 3)_, 
"that by reason of said acts of malice and 
oppression of defendant towards plaintiff as 
hereinabove set forth plaintiff has suffered dam-
age ... " 
One searches the complaint in va1n for a single, 
solitary act alleged on the part of the defendant, except 
only "that he caused to be recorded" the Notice. All 
other allegations are conclusions of a general nature 
of what his intentions were, and not a solitary state-
ment of any act on which to base such conclusions as 
to his intentions. 
Findings of malice required to support slan-
der of title action, must be based on facts indi-
cating its existence.-Briggs v. Coykendall, 224 
N.W. 202, 57 N.D. 785. 
A person is not liable in damages merely for 
being unsuccessful in defending or asserting ju-
dicially what he believes to be his right.-Clark 
v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 136 So. 1, 172 La. 913. 
Malice or want of good faith and want of prob-
able cause are essential elements of the action of 
slander of title and damages cannot he recovered 
where it appears that such element is absent and 
the defendant is asserting a bona fide claim in 
good faith though without right.-Ward v. Mid-
West & Gulf Co., 223 P. 170, 97 Okla. 252. 
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Words spoken or written regarding property 
or title are not actionable per se.-Briggs v. Coy-
kendall, 224 N.W. 202, 57 N.D. 785. 
Malice is a necessary ingredient to entitle 
plaintiff to recover in an action for slander of 
title and the action cannot be maintained if the 
claim was asserted by defendant in good faith or 
if the acts complained of were founded on prob-
able cause or were so prompted by a reasonable 
belief, although the statement may have been 
false.-Local Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of 
Oklahoma v. Sickles, 165 P. 2d 328. 
Malice is a necessary ingredient of an action 
for slander on title, and must be both alleged and 
proven, since a claim of title asserted in good 
faith will not constitute a basis for an action of 
slander of title.-Waterhouse v. McPheeters, 145 
S.W. 2d 766 (Tenn.). 
Before liability on theory of "slander of title" 
can be established the party accused must have 
acted maliciously and the fact he had no claim, 
itself does not establish malice since, if he only 
had reasonable grounds to believe he had an 
equity or legal title in the lands, assertion of his 
claim could not be slander of title.-Allison v. 
Berry, 44 N.E. 2d 929, 316 Ill. App. 261. 
Filing or recording of an instrument such as 
a lien is not actionable per se, but must be mali-
ciously levied.-Gudger v. Manton, 123 P. 2d 635. 
Defendant asserts that because the only act on the 
part of the defendant set out in plaintiff's complaint, 
that of recording the Notice, he has failed to allege 
malice as required in an action for slander of title. 
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The question of Malice will lw furthl·r diseu::;seJ 
under Point 2. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IX 0YERRULING PLAINTIFF'S 
SPECIAL DEMURRER. 
Defendant believes that the matters referred to in 
par. 1 (R. 7) of his special demurrer are covered by his 
general demurrer, so will pass to the second paragraph 
of his special demurrer, viz: 
"That said complaint is uncertain in that it 
cannot be determined from paragraph 4 thereof 
or said complaint what constitutes the 'claim' 
which plaintiff alleges to be false and without 
right." (R. 7). 
As stated in Potso Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 135 P. 1078, 
36 Nev. 390, it must appear that the words complained 
of were false. Defendant was entitled to know just what 
was the ''claim'' which plaintiff alleged was false, since 
he did not allege the falsity of any words. In alleging 
that the above ''claim'' was false, did he mean that 
Doris Trust Company falsely claimed residence at 1430 
South ~lain Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; or that Addi-
son Cain falsely claimed to be the President of Doris 
Trust Company; or that the payment of $1,000.00 waR 
a false claim; or that the lots mentinod were not in Fox's 
Subdivision or not in Salt Lake City, Utah; or that they 
\rere purchased for Doris Trust Company by S. W. 
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Dowse; or that the payment of $1,000.00 was on the pur-
chase price of the lots, etc~ 
Defendant alleges that the complaint was not cer-
tain as to the above matters and that par. 2 of his special 
demurrer should have been sustained. 
In his special demurrer (R. 7), the defendant set 
forth, par. 4, 
"That said complaint is uncertain in that it 
cannot be determined therefrom what were the 
acts of oppression and what were the acts of 
malice on the part of the defendant, as alleged in 
said complaint.'' 
:Malice being one of the essential elements of an 
action for slander of title, it must be based on facts 
indicating its existence. (Briggs v. Coykendall), hereto-
fore referred to). No such basic facts appear in the com-
plaint, and hence this paragraph of defendant's special 
demurrer should have been sustained. 
POINT 3 and POINT 4 
THE CouRT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT's :MoTION Fou 
DISMISSAL oF THE CoMPLAINT; AND IN OvERRULING DE-
FENDANT's OBJECTION TO TESTIMONY THEREUNDER. 
(R. 50, 52). 
Defendant based his motion and objection on his 
contention that the complaint was fatally defective and 
did not state a cause of action. The same argument~ 
apply here as are set out under defendant's POINT 1, 
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and will therefore not be repeated, but referred to iu 
support of the clain1ed error of the court hereunder. 
As the matters hereinbefore discussed relate to the 
pleadings, it is thought adYisable, before taking up the 
remaining Points on which defendant relies for reversal 
of the judgment, briefly to review the evidence in the 
case, as it pertains to the four essential elements con-
:-tituting slander of title, i.e., (A) The vVords Published; 
(B) Falsity of 'Vords Published; (C) :Maliciousness; 
and (D) Special Damages. 
THE EYIDE~CE 
(A) As to TV ords Published. 
Defendant admitted in his answer the filing of the 
Notice. 
There is no testimony in the record that the }Hing 
of the Notice decreased the value of the property, or 
thwarted any sale, or that anyone because of seeing it 
on that account had refused to purchase the property. 
Defendant further asserts that because the notice 
"~as not acknowledged as required by law, referred to 
hereinbefore in discussing this topic under POINT 1, 
there was no publication. 
(B) Falsity of the Words Published. 
While the plaintiff in his complaint has not alleged 
that any of the words in the Notice were false, merely 
alleging that, 
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"That the claim set forth in said instrument 
which was duly recorded as hereinbefore set forth 
was false and without right whatever, and de-
fendant at time of recording said instrument as 
hereinabove set forth, had no estate, right, title 
or interest whatever in or to or upon said land 
. " or premises . . . 
it might be well to break down the Notice and call al-
tention to the following: 
(1) The words, "That One Thousand Dol-
lars has been paid towards the purchase price .. '' 
Defendant's Exhibit 2, a check for $1,000.00, dated 
July 31, 1945, on the face of which was written ''First 
on, Lot 13th So. and 1st \Vest St.'' payable to the order 
of Selwin Dowse and endorsed ''Selwin Dowse'' '' S. W. 
Dowse" was received in evidence. (R. 75). 
Plaintiff testified that that check was received by 
him and cashed by him, being the same $1,000.00 re-
ferred to in the Notice sued upon, paid to·wards the pur-
chase price of the lots referred to; that it was paid; and 
that that statement, "That One Thousand Dollars has 
been paid towards the purchase price,'' was not a false 
statement, (R. 73); and that he (plaintiff) was selling 
the lots to him (defendant). (R. 74). 
(2) The words, " ... and that the balance, 
plus a reasonable commission will be paid on de-
mand on delivery of deed.'' 
Plaintiff further testified, in response to questions, 
(R. 74) as follows: 
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Q. And the state1nent: "that the balane(~ plus 
reasonable commission will be paid upon de-
mand of the deed,'' is that correct 1 
A. It is correct so far as if he had paid the 
correct balance, I would have delivered the 
deed to him, yes. 
Q. If he had paid the balance owing you would 
have been willing to give him the deed'? 
A. Yes, certainly. 
Q. So that part of the statement is all right'? 
A. It is all right. 
Q. So that isn't a false staten1ent '? 
A. No. 
(3) The words, "That certain property de-
scribed as: All of Lots one to eleven in Fox's 
Subdivision, an addition to Salt Lake City, Utah 
-was purchased for Doris Trust Company by 
S. W. Dowse, as their agent ... '' 
The plaintiff testified that he had an agreement 
with Doris Trust Company about the purchase of the 
Lots 1 to 11 Fox's subdivision, that he was selling the 
-property to him (meaning Doris Trust Company), un-
der which agreement he was to pay the balance. (R. 
73, 74). 
On Redirect Examination, Mr. Dowse testified that 
the above-quoted statement was untrue. (R. 78), mean-
ing no doubt that part, the lots ''was purchased for Doris 
Trust Company by S. W. Dow8e, as their agent" was 
not true. 
Everything else in the Notice is admitted by plain-
tiff to be true, except the statement, 
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"was purchased for Doris Trust Company 
by S. W. Dowse, as their agent." 
It is apparent from the record that there was a 
misunderstanding as to just what were the terms of 
the deal or agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
with respect to the sale and purchase of the lots in 
question. 
Plaintiff in par. 4 of his complaint (R. 2) alleges 
that, 
'' ... the defendant at the time of recording 
said instrument as hereinabove set forth (Aug. 
9, 1945) had no estate, right, title or interest 
whatever in or to or upon said land or premises, 
or any part thereof; ... '' 
and yet he admits under oath on the witness stand 
that he did have an agreement to sell the property to 
the defendant and that the defendant had paid $1,000.00 
thereon. 
Mr. Addison Cain testified (R. 94) that he prepared 
the Notice in question, and that when he filed it (Aug. 
9, 1945) he put therein what at the time of filing he 
believed to be the agreement between them, and he 
believed the statements therein were true. (R. 95 ). 
Plaintiff introducd in evidence his Exhibit C, a 
letter dated August 20, 1945, from Doris Trust Com-
pany to plaintiff, in which appears the following: (R. 
80, 81) 
''Herewith we are returning your check for 
One Thousand Dollars and notify you now in 
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writing that we are tendering you the balance 
of the Fifteen Hundred dollars you paid out for 
us on the purchase price of Lots 1 to 11 Fox's 
Subdivision together with the regular fee of 5% 
$150. for your purchase, ... '' 
The above Exhibit, written shortly after the check 
payment, and the filing of the X otice, would seem to 
corroborate defendant's contention as to what he con-
sidered to be the terms of the deal, at the time he filed 
the Notice. 
C. Malice. 
Plaintiff testified that defendant agreed to pay 
$2625 for the property, subject to delinquent taxes, and 
agreed to pay $1,000 dovvn (R. 65); that he ordered a 
tax search, that :Mr. Cain said the tax search \vas all 
right and that he would come up and pay $500.00 rnore; 
that he came back the same day and made demand to 
give him the deed for $500.00 more (R. 66); that plain-
tiff refused to give the deed for $500.00 more, as that 
was not the price agreed upon; that he (Mr. Cain) said 
he would take me into court; if necessary, go to the 
Supreme Court, and plaintiff advised him he was at 
liberty to do so. (R. 67) ; that plaintiff thought he told 
defendant at that time, if he didn't want it he would 
give him his money back (R. 82); to which defendant 
replied "nothing doing", he wanted the property and 
he was going to get it. (R. 83). 
Mrs. Dowse, wife of plaintiff, also testified that 
she was present when :Mr. Cain came in and asked that 
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they make out the deed while she was present and clos~ 
up the deal; that her husband replied "for the .first price 
you agreed on first"; that Mr. Cain said, "no you only 
paid $1500 for that property and that is all you are go-
ing to get out of me,-you are not going to make a profit 
out of me"; that he further said that her husband only 
paid $1500.00 for it and he would take him through the 
Supreme Court if necessary to get that property for 
that price (R. 86); that Mr. Dowse said he would give 
him the $1,000.00 back and forget the whole thing, or 
go through with it as originally agreed. (R. 87). 
This evidence so far as it reflects defendant's atti-
ture, supports defendant's contention that the deal was 
on a commission basis, except as to plaintiff's statement 
that he was to receive $2625.00 for the property, sub-
ject to the taxes. 
Defendant affirms that there is no evidence intro-
duced to show malice as an element of a slander of title 
action. There was a deal pending between the parties; 
defendant had paid $1,000.00 thereon; plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant agreed to pay $2625 for the lots, sub-
ject to taxes. He further testified, however, that at the 
time of making the deal with defendant, the lots had 
been sold to Salt Lake County ten years prior, for de-
linquent taxes for 1933, (R. 76), and that he did not 
get it until a year after the deal with defendant (R. 77); 
that subsequent to July 18, (1945) he had to pay back 
taxes, had to pay off sewer taxes, had to get a new ab-
stract, and had to bring an action against Salt Lake 
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County as they first rpfused to giYe him a tax deed, (R. 
55); that he was prevented fr01n getting tax deed as OJH~ 
of the county eommissioners wanted the property him-
self. (R. 82). 
:Jir. Cain testified that after paying the $1,000, there 
were other conYersations; that plaintiff was trying to 
get the ta..'ws adjusted and we couldn't close the deal 
because he didn't get the amount of taxes ascertained 
that he would have to pay to the county. (R. 94). 
D. Special Damages. 
There is no evidence in the record showing or tend-
ing to show any special damages suffered by plaintiff. 
POINT 5 
THE CouRT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EviDENCE PLAINTIFF's 
ExHIBIT C. (R. 80, 81). 
The Notice was filed August 9, 1945. Exhibit C, 
later identified as C-1 and C-2 (R. 117) showed trans-
actions subsequent to the filing of the Notice; Exhibit 
C-2 being check dated August 17, 1945, which plaintiff 
sent to Addison Cain, and C-1 a letter returning the 
check to plain tiff. 
These exhibits have no bearing on special damages, 
publishing and uttering malicious words, the falsity of 
published words, or malice alleged to have been exhibited 
in filing the Notice. 
It is impossible to determine what effect they had 
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with the jury in its determining of exemplary damages; 
or what weight the court gave to these exhibits in 
granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict. 
POINT 6 
THE CouRT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFENDANT's MoTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. (R. 117). 
Defendant asserts that defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict should have been granted both on the 
law and on the evidence: on the law for the reasons 
hereinbefore set forth under Point 1; and on the evi-
dence, as follows : 
All of the- statements in the Notice were admitted 
or evidence given in support thereof, except that de-
fendant testified the statement, that the property was 
purchased for the Doris Trust Company by S. \V. Dowse 
as their agent, was untrue. 
One Thousand dollars had been paid towards the 
purchase price (R. 75); the parties had entered into 
some agreement for the sale and purchase, (R. 73, 74); 
the deal was still pending when the Notice was filed, as 
indicated by Exhibit C. (R. 81); the court made findings 
in the former case to the effect that there was an oral 
agreement, with insufficient memoranda in writing to 
make it enforceable, Def's. Exhibit 4 (R. 89, 92), in 
which it also found that on May 11, 1946, defendant 
made a demand on the plaintiff for the refund or repay-
ment of the $1,000.00 paid on the agreement; that plain-
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tiff refused to pay the san1e or any part thereof; and 
that as of February ~8. 1947, the plaintiff was the 
owner as against defendant, and that defendant then 
had no right, title or interest therein; that defendant 
was entitled to repayment of the $1,000.00, \dth interest 
from "J[ay 11, 1946 (date of demand for repayment) 
and that "each party shall bear his own costs." 
POINT 7 
THE CouRT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF's l\IoTION FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT. (R. 107). 
Defendant asserts that in view that the complaint 
was fatally defective, as set out in his discussion under 
Point 1, it was error to grant the motion. 
Further, there was no evidence received showing 
special damages; all of the statements in the Notice were 
admitted to be true by plaintiff, except as to a min::>r 
statement therein which plaintiff testified was untrue; 
there was no evidence of malice as a basis for a slander 
of title action. 
In granting the motion for a directed verdict, the 
court made the following statement: 
"Well, I shall grant the motion of the plain-
tiff for directed verdict, that means a verdict in 
what sum do you contend~" 
To which .J[r. Backman, one of the attorneys for the 
plaintiff, replied, 
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''Well, we contend we have shown the dam-
ages of $250. which was the amount incurred by 
the plaintiff in clearing his title." (R. 108). 
Defendant affirms that the granting of the motion 
for directed verdict in view of that admission by counsel, 
to the effect that the alleged damage of $250. was the 
amount incurred by the plaintiff in clearing his title, 
was error. 
Calling attention again to defendant's Exhibit 4 (R. 
89, 92), based on its Findings of Fact therein, the court 
in its Conclusions of Law held, that each party shall 
bear his own costs. 
Now to grant the plaintiff $250.00, the amount in-
curred by him in clearing his title, when the court re-
fused to grant him any costs in the case where he al-
leges he paid the $250.00, would he a most unusual pro-
cedure; and would constitute a collateral attack on the 
prior judgment. 
POINT 8 
THE CouRT ERRED IN SuBMITTING THE QuESTION OF 
AMOUNT OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE JURY. (R. 113). 
Under Point 1, subheading (C), defendant has called 
attention to Malice as it applies to actions for slander 
of title. 
Without showing malice, one cannot prevail in such 
an action, to obtain special damages suffered. In other 
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words, in the instant case, plaintiff would haYe to prove 
malice even to obtain special dmnages. 
If he has proven such Inalice as "Tould warrant the 
'verdict for the special dan1ages alleged, then it would 
appear that defendant would have to be guilty of 
"super" malice in order to justify the court in sub-
mitting the question of exemplary damages to the jury; 
it would have to be "malice on malice". 
To justify recovery of "exemplary damages", 
act causing injury must be done with evil intent 
and purpose of injuring plaintiff, or with such 
wanton and reckless disregard of his rights as 
evidences wrongful motive.-Calhown v. Univer-
sal Credit Co. et al, 106 Utah 166, 146 P. 2d 284. 
Defendant asserts that there is no evidence in the 
record whatever to warrant submitting to the jury the 
question of amount of such damages. 
Further, that in an action for slander of title only 
special damages are recoverable. 
POINT 9 
THE CouRT ERRED WITH RESPECT TO EAcH PoRTION OF 
INSTRUCTION No. 1 As GIVEN To THE JuRY (R. 113-114) 
AND TO WHICH DEFENDANT NOTED AN ExcEPTION. 
(R. 117). 
The Court erred in its first paragraph of Instruc-
tion No. 1, wherein the jury was directed to find the 
issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 
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No special damages having been shown or proved, 
this instruction should not have been given. 
The court erred in its second paragraph of Instruc-
tion No. 1, wherein it stated that compensatory damages 
are damages awarded for injuries actually sustained 
resulting from an act by a person against whom the 
issues are found, in this case against the defendant, for· 
the reason that compensatory damages are not recover-
able in an action for slander of title. 
The court erred in its third paragraph of Instruc-
tion No. 1, wherein it directed the jury to fix the amount 
of plaintiff's compensatory damages, that is the amount 
shown by the evidence, for the reason that only special 
damages and not compensatory damages are recoverable. 
The court erred in its fifth paragraph, and also to 
all of paragraph 6 of Instruction No. 1. 
POINT 10 
THE CouRT ERRED IN FAILING TO CHARGE THE JURY As 
SET FoRTH IN EAcH OF DEFENDANT's REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS N 0. 1 ·TO 5, INCLUSIVE. ( R. 35-39). 
The record does not show that defendant took ex-
ceptions to the court's failure to instruct the jury as 
requested. 
The record in this case does not indicate that an-
other trial might disclose new facts or improve or 
change plaintiff's proof of his claimed cause of action. 
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\Y e contend that the judgment appealed from should 
be reYersed and that entry of judgment for defendant 
should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID A. WEST, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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